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A Universal and Absolute Spiritualism  
Maine de BiranÕs Leibniz 
Jeremy Dunham (University of Sheffield) 
 
In France during the nineteenth century the production of new editions, interpretations, and 
expositions of early modern philosophical texts was a flourishing activity. However, it is 
important to recognise when examining the scholarly works of this period that such 
interpretation and exposition was almost never produced without an agenda. A favourable 
interpretation of one of the giants of early modern philosophy that shows them to be the natural 
ÔfatherÕ of oneÕs own philosophical perspective could act as a significant legitimation of this view 
and, consequently, could become a weapon in philosophical combat. In this chapter I argue that 
Maine de BiranÕs interpretation of Leibniz, and in particular his 1819 Exposition de la doctrine 
philosophique de Leibniz, should be partially understood in this spirit. I show that the importance of 
BiranÕs selective Leibnizianism is clear already in the 1811 Copenhagen treatise; however, it gains 
added significance in the 1819 text since he, I argue, uses his selective interpretation as a defence 
of his own position and critiques the remaining aspects of LeibnizÕs philosophy to demonstrate 
the weaknesses of another philosophical position developed by one of BiranÕs contemporaries: 
the Ôyoung professorÕ Victor Cousin. Furthermore, even after BiranÕs death in 1824, this strategic 
encounter with Leibniz turned out to be crucial for the development of nineteenth-century 
French thought. Not only did Biran present an alternative spiritualism to CousinÕs eclecticism 
(which was to become the orthodox philosophy of the State), he correctly identified its major 
faults, and left the seeds for its eventual overthrow. Understood as such, therefore, we can 
recognize the vital historical role played by BiranÕs short Exposition de la philosophie de Leibniz. It 
was in part responsible for a significant change of direction in French philosophy and its 
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influence can be recognised in a lineage that passes through Flix Ravaisson, Pierre Leroux, 
mile Boutroux, Henri Bergson, to Gilles Deleuze.     
The question driving this chapter is Ôwhy did Maine de Biran believe it to be productive to 
engage selectively with Leibnizianism?Õ I argue that there are three main reasons, and this chapter 
is structured so that each reason is addressed in turn roughly following the chronological 
development of BiranÕs thought. In ¤1, I show that by separating the a priori from the a 
posteriori aspects of LeibnizÕs philosophical method, Biran believed he could more distinctly 
bring to light a key part of LeibnizÕs metaphysics of experience. Contrary to previous 
commentators on Biranian Leibnizianism, I argue that BiranÕs project is not opposed to LeibnizÕs 
conception of force and experience, but fundamentally in line with it. Nonetheless, I do not 
suggest that BiranÕs project is reducible to LeibnizÕs, and in ¤2 I show how Biran used this 
engagement with Leibnizian philosophy to develop his own. I focus on [i] his defence of force 
contra Hume and [ii] his theory of the virtual, and I argue that these promising developments of 
LeibnizÕs metaphysics, although not without problems, are crucial for understanding both the 
fertility of LeibnizÕs system and the influence of spiritualism in French philosophy more 
generally. The final reason Biran engages with Leibnizianism is that he could use the argument 
for the necessity of the selection to present a clandestine critique of Victor CousinÕs eclecticism. 
As I show in ¤2 Biran believed that his philosophy was a spiritualist development of the best 
parts of Leibnizianism; and, I argue in ¤3, he was able to use the opportunity of the 1819 
Exposition to show the superiority of his spiritualism to CousinÕs alternative by concurrently 
insinuating that the latterÕs was in line with LeibnizianismÕs worst parts. In the battle for the true 
heart of LeibnizÕs philosophy, Biran believed his own spiritualism to be the real descendent of 
the monadology properly understood. 
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1. MAINE DE BIRANÕS SELECTIVE LEIBNIZIANISM 
BiranÕs 1811 Copenhagen Treatise opens with an epigraph from LeibnizÕs 1707 letter to Michael 
Gottlieb Hansch on Platonic philosophy (D.II.222-25). Both the choice of text and the way the 
quote has been ÔcutÕ are important. The choice of this reasonably esoteric text shows us that 
Biran must have already been deeply engaged in his study of LeibnizÕs work. Nonetheless, the 
most interesting point for understanding BiranÕs appropriation of Leibnizian philosophy is the 
cut. Here is the sentence in full with the part used for the epigraph in bold:  
For we have now seen, from the pre-established harmony, that God has ordered all 
things so wonderfully that corporeal machines serve minds and what is providence 
in a mind is fate in a body. (E.446: L.593)  
The relevance of the cut is that Biran believes that LeibnizÕs philosophy is crucial for presenting 
us with a way to reconsider the mindÕs ÔprovidenceÕ in relation to organic corporal machines. 
Nonetheless, Leibniz undermines this insightÕs full potential by overshadowing it with his 
rationalist theory of pre-established harmony (PEH). However, if we cut this latter part from his 
system, we are left with a philosophy of experience that is a stark improvement on either the 
Descartes-Malebranche-Spinoza rationalist school or the Locke-Hume-Condillac sensualist 
school. I call Biranian Leibnizianism Ôselective LeibnizianismÕ because I disagree with the 
previous commentators on this work (Naville, 1859, Robef 1925, Naert 1983, Vermenen 1987 
and 1995) who agree that the Leibniz Biran creates through this move is more Biranian than 
Leibnizian and the conception of force that results is distinctly opposed to LeibnizÕs own. On 
the contrary, I argue in this section that Biran was a remarkably insightful reader of LeibnizÕs 
philosophy, and a close reading of texts that were available to him, as well as of texts that were 
not, show that Biranian Leibnizianism is still recognisably Leibnizian. As I show in ¤2, it is an 
ampliative rather than a distortive Leibnizianism, even if, as I argue in ¤3, BiranÕs choice to write an 
exposition of LeibnizÕs philosophy was made with a significant strategic agenda.   
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Although LeibnizÕs philosophy was always a presence in BiranÕs writing, its importance 
considerably increased towards the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century. At the 
centuryÕs commencement, Leibniz is the audacious genius who attempted but failed to execute 
the impossible project of the universal characteristic (OMDB.I.297; II.290-291), yet by 1811 (as I 
suggest the epigraph is supposed to signify) he has become BiranÕs important influence: thinking 
with Leibniz became one of BiranÕs most important strategies for the development of his own 
thought. This is also exemplified by the fact that one of the mere two texts that Biran published 
after the 1802 Influence de lÕhabitude and before his death in 1824 was an exposition of LeibnizÕs 
philosophy. His change of attitude was principally encouraged by an engagement with two 
books: Joseph Marie DegrandoÕs (1804) Histoire compare des systmes de philosophe and Madame de 
StalÕs (1810) De lÕAllemagne. The first caused a global change in BiranÕs attitude to philosophyÕs 
history. As Henri Gouhier (1948: 251-252) shows, before reading DegrandoÕs text, Biran 
believed it was not possible to develop both the Ôintense eruditionÕ necessary for historical 
scholarship and the judgment and reflection necessary for progress in ÔpsychologyÕ. However, the 
formerÕs book proved that the two could be Ôvery happily reconciled... and even lend mutual aid 
to each otherÕ (1948: 252). Degrando showed Biran that the history of philosophy need not 
simply be thinking about a past great philosopher; thinking with a past great philosopher could be 
to do philosophy, and even significantly improve oneÕs philosophizing. Nonetheless, it would be 
StalÕs work (and conversation1) that would suggest to Biran the great profit that could be gained 
from thinking specifically with Leibniz and present in embryo the view of his work Biran would 
develop in his philosophy Ð especially in the 1819 Exposition.        
StalÕs engaging three-volume work on Germany was of the utmost importance for the reception 
of German philosophy in France during the first half of the nineteenth century2. De lÕAllemagne 
was pioneering because it clearly identified both the problems with eighteenth-century French 
                                                             
1 ÔConversation with this famous woman is always brilliant and animatedÕ (JI.I.224-225). 
2 See Vermeren (1995: 35-39) to which the discussion of Stal owes much.  
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philosophy and the direction it should take in the nineteenth. For Stal, the sensualism or 
Lockean empiricism that took hold of French and English philosophy throughout the eighteenth 
century was the Ôprincipal cause of immoralityÕ. Locke and CondillacÕs replacement of conscience 
and liberty with interest and determinism made philosophy the enemy of humanity and alienated 
it from the profoundest Ôbeliefs of the heartÕ (See MDS.III.29-30). Nonetheless, since Leibniz, 
she claims, the greatest German minds have taken a more productive route, one in tune with the 
spirit of humanity. They have shown there is an inextricable link between metaphysics and 
morality. This, she believes, is a profound discovery since it shows why philosophy must be 
studied by all educated minds. The difference between a philosophy of mind which defends the 
doctrine of the passive tabula rasa and one which defends the existence of the causa sui active 
mind which can draw truth from its own resources carries with it the greatest of consequences. It 
is the latter on which liberty and morality depends. The father of this Ôtrue philosophyÕ is, 
according to Stal, Leibniz. He is both GermanyÕs:     
Bacon and Descartes. We find in this excellent genius all the qualities which the German 
philosophers in general glory to aim at: immense erudition, good faith, enthusiasm 
hidden under strict form and methodÉ everything in Leibniz displayed those virtues 
which are allied to sublimity of thought, and which deserve at once our admiration and 
our respect. (MDS.III.58-59) 
After stressing her admiration, she proceeds to split LeibnizÕs work into two halves; a division 
Biran will follow. First, she claims that LeibnizÕs wild a priori reasonings are indefensible. He 
Ôpushed his abstractions too farÕ (MDS.III.63), and the resultÑPEH and the theory of monads 
qua the universeÕs Ôsimple elementsÕÑwere gratuitous over-speculations. Nonetheless, when 
Leibniz resisted the temptation to be led astray by abstraction, and stuck to concrete reflection 
on the soulÕs inner workings, the results were amongst the most insightful in philosophyÕs 
history. His greatest achievement was to add the sublime restriction Ôexcept the intellect itselfÕ to 
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the empiricist claim that there is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses (NE.111). 
This restriction is the result, and signifies his defence, of the activity of the soul, his experimental 
reflection on inner sense, his affirmation of moral liberty, and his maintenance of the Ômoral 
being in its independence and rightsÕ (MDS.III.69). This is the everlasting foundation on which 
the great German speculative systems were built.    
Importantly, Stal insists that FranceÕs turn to the Locke-Hume-Condillac school has been an 
unfortunate detour. Had France continued to follow its seventeenth-century great minds, such as 
Descartes and Malebranche, it would now share the same philosophical opinions as those 
promoted in Germany. FranceÕs philosophical progress in the nineteenth century could be 
significantly boosted by a return to the systems of its early modern genii. Leibniz then should 
become a crucial figure for French philosophers wishing to reinstate the conversation with those 
intellects outre-Rhin, since Ôin the progress of philosophyÕ, she claims, ÔLeibniz is the natural 
successor of Descartes and Malebranche, and Kant of LeibnizÕ (MDS.III.38). Nonetheless, 
despite emphasising the era-changing importance of KantÕs work, she is lukewarm regarding the 
necessity of studying it in the requisite depth to master it. She even says that Ô[n]o one in France 
would give himself the trouble of studying works so thickly set with difficulties as those of KantÕ 
(MDS.III.96). Her judgment that Leibniz provided modern philosophyÕs everlasting foundation 
while Kant was barely worth studying in original was probably a major contributing factor for 
why FranceÕs philosophy from the first three quarters of the nineteenth century is better 
understood as Ôpost-LeibnizianÕ than Ôpost-KantianÕ3.     
Biran follows StalÕs evaluation of the most important aspect of LeibnizÕs metaphysics since he 
too regards it is a system capable of providing a proper analysis of the inner workings of the 
soul. Furthermore, for Biran, it offers a metaphysics of personality; a way to do justice to 
individuality without it either being swallowed up in the all-encompassing power of the God of 
                                                             
3 See Dunham (forthcoming).  
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the occasionalists, or becoming, with the empiricists, the mere passive effect of impressions. 
LeibnizÕs metaphysics presents us with a Ôuniversal and absolute spiritualismÕ (OMB.XI-I.151); a 
doctrine capable of conquering the inherent passivity in both the aforementioned positions, 
leaving us with a truly free moral subject. Again, metaphysics and morals are inextricably linked4. 
Following Stal further, Biran divides LeibnizÕs work into two parts: the first rationalistic, the 
second experiential. However, he advances on Stal by demonstrating that these two parts are 
fundamentally incompatible. First, we have the Leibniz of forces and free individuals, but 
second, we have LeibnizÕs rationalist God, or absolute, that, in common with the Gods of all of 
the Cartesian metaphysical systems, threatens to subsume the freedom of the individual under its 
all-encompassing power and leads to pantheism. In this section, I explain BiranÕs understanding 
of the experiential part, but I leave his argument for its incompatibility with the a priori part until 
¤3.  
Metaphysics begins, for Biran, with Descartes (OMB.VI.17-8). His philosophy marked its 
genuine commencement for three related reasons. First, he established the dividing line between 
the functions of the body and those of the mind whilst he, second, inaugurated the proper 
introspective method or Ôway of reflectionÕ to study the latter. FinallyÑand for Biran 
consequentlyÑhe made the testimony of inner sense the generative principle of all knowledge. 
Nonetheless, Biran argued that the Cartesian metaphysical system suffers from a serious flaw. 
The fundamental system is prone to slip towards pantheism. As soon as the idea of a ÔpassiveÕ 
substance is introduced, the Cartesian metaphysics begins to collapse into a form of monism; 
both res extensa and res cogitans are swallowed up by the infinite substance: God. According to 
BiranÕs interpretation of DescartesÕs metaphysics, no power belongs to Ôextended substanceÕ 
through which it could cause itself to act. The only qualities that belong to its essence are 
extension, flexibility, and changeability (AT.VII.31: CSM.II.20). As extension has no power of its 
                                                             
4 ÔMadame de Stal appeared to have been well aware of the intimate links which unite metaphysics and morality in a 
common principleÕ (JI.I.84). 
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own, whenever it feels as though we are resisting the power of a material object, we are actually 
resisting God. Unfortunately, extension is not the only passive substance in DescartesÕs system. 
For he argues that the distinction between creation and preservation is only ÔconceptualÕ and the 
same force needed to initially create the world, i.e., the infinite force of God, is required at every 
moment to preserve it: duration is constant recreation (AT.VII.48-9: CSM.II.33). Thus, 
whenever it feels as though I voluntarily will an action, it is not the I that wills, but God. I have 
the desire (itself caused by God), but I am not responsible for the causal action (cf. G.IV.515: 
AG.165-6). The dynamic play of the mind and universe results from GodÕs power alone. Biran 
argues that the pantheist consequence of this hypothesis is the same for all of the Cartesian 
systems. His logic is simple:  
1. God is the sole cause, and every other existing being is merely an effect of GodÕs power. 
2. It is Ôlogically certain that all effects are eminently or formally enclosed in their causeÕ 
(OMB.XI-I.142)  
3. Every created being is enclosed in God and there is no real distinction between God and 
nature. [By 1 & 2] 
SpinozaÕs route is different, but the destination is the same. For the Spinozist argues that if the 
distinction between extension and thought depends on a difference of attribute or fundamental mode 
alone, there is no reason why these attributes or modes should not belong to one ultimate 
substance. This logically follows from DescartesÕs definition of substance as a Ôthing which exists 
in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existenceÕ (AT.VIIIA.24: CSM.II.210) and 
his belief that ÔextensionÕ and ÔthoughtÕ exist Ôonly with the help of GodÕs concurrenceÕ. Biran 
concludes that only mysticism separates occasionalism and Spinozism, Ôlogic unites themÕ 
(OMB.XI-I.142).  
LeibnizÕs great merit is that he escaped the errors of pantheism by developing a metaphysics of 
forces and refused to allow ÔforceÕ to be subsumed under the power of the infinite being: 
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To what did Leibniz grasp onto to keep himself from this dangerous precipice, which, 
since the origin of philosophy, has led the boldest and most profound speculators 
towards the empty concept of the great whole, nothingness deified, the devouring abyss that 
comes to absorb all individual existence? We must say it, the author of the system of 
monads was saved from this disastrous aberration only by the nature or the proper 
character of the principle on which he based his system; a principle truly one and 
individual - the primitive fact of the existence of the I, before having acquired a unique 
and absolute notion. A system that multiplied or divided the living forces in accordance 
with the intelligible elements or atoms of nature, would, it seems, prevent or dissipate 
forever those sad and disastrous illusions of Spinozism, too favoured by DescartesÕs 
principle. (OMB.XI-I.140) 
While all Cartesian created substances are, on the final analysis, passive, Leibniz presents a 
metaphysics where all created substances are ultimately active: ÔToute substance est force en soi, et toute 
force ou tre simple est substanceÕ. For Leibniz, rather than substance being a placeholder for forces in 
which they inhere, force constitutes substance. While Descartes Ôconstructed thought with 
elements borrowed from a passive natureÕ, Leibniz Ôconstructed nature with elements taken from 
the activity of the IÕ (OMDB.VIII.223). Biran places a great deal of importance on a 1694 text 
called ÔOn the Corrections of Metaphysics and the Concept of SubstanceÕ (G.IV.468-70: L.432-
434), and on one short passage in which he claims to find LeibnizÕs whole system condensed. 
The passage follows (I have divided it into five parts for analytical reasons):   
[A] from the concept of substance I offerÉ. followÉ primary truths even about God 
and minds and the nature of bodies Ð truthsÉ of the greatest utility for the future in the 
other sciencesÉ [B] the concept of forces or powers, which the Germans call Kraft and the 
French la force, and for whose explanation I have set up a distinct science of dynamics, 
brings the strongest light to bear upon our understanding of the true concept of substance. 
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[C] Active force differs from the mere power familiar to the Schools, for the active 
power or faculty of the schools is nothing but a close possibility of acting, which needs 
an external excitation or a stimulus, as it were, to be transferred into action. Active force, 
in contrast, contains a certain act or entelechy and is thus midway between the faculty of 
acting and the act itself and involves a conatus. It is thus carried into action by itself and 
needs no help but only the removal of an impediment. [D] This can be illustrated by the 
example of a heavy hanging body which strains at the rope which holds it or by a bent 
bow. For though gravity and elasticity can and ought to be explained mechanically by the 
motion of the ether, the ultimate reason for motion in matter is nevertheless the force 
impressed upon it in creation, which inheres in every body but is variously limited and 
restrained in nature through the impact of bodies upon each other. [E] I say that this 
power of acting inheres in all substance and that some action always arises from it, so 
that corporal substance itself does not, any more than spiritual substance, ever cease to 
act. (G.IV.469-70: L.433; cf. UL.VI.530: WFNS.35 & G.IV.472: WFNS.22)      
This passage is so valuable for Biran for two reasons. First, the novel conception of force in [C] 
presents an alternative to the Cartesian theory of passive substance and thus blocks one route to 
pantheism; and, second, he believes it shows that the notion of force, which replaces substance, 
is gained from analogical reflection on the active nature of the primitive fact of our self-
consciousness, and we can methodologically work from first-person introspection to 
metaphysical truths concerning souls, bodies, and God. Most commentators have argued that by 
reading Leibniz this way, Biran has actually reversed LeibnizÕs method. Euthyme Robef argued that 
Leibniz introduced active force into philosophy to make it Ôfully rational following the purely a 
priori type of objective truthÕ. LeibnizÕs concept of force is obtained from external origins and is 
Ôobjective, abstract, formal, and universalÕ and Ônot at all subjective, inner, reflexiveÕ (1925: 22-23; 
cf. Naville, OI.I.CV, Naert 1983: 511, and Vermeren 1995: 55-56). Robef concludes that we 
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could even say that BiranÕs and LeibnizÕs doctrines of active force diverge so profoundly that 
they are in fact opposed to each other. Rather than ÔspiritualizeÕ nature, Leibniz Ômaterializes the 
mindÕ: ÔThe reflexive notions of radical energy, active force, or tendency participate more in pure 
automatism and the passivity of matter, than in the final efficacy and freedom of the mindÕ 
(1925: 100). From the passage above, we can see that this claim is not without some prima facie 
plausibility. In [B] Leibniz relates ÔforceÕ to his science of dynamics and the examples he uses in 
[D] to illustrate active force as described in [C] are drawn from external sense perception, not 
from ideas of reflection. Nonetheless, I suggest that if we play close attention to [E], the real role 
of [D] is illuminated. In [E] Leibniz takes it for granted that spiritual substances never cease to 
act. He believes we cannot doubt this considering our constant access to its proof: internal 
reflection. What needs to be shown is that this is true also of corporeal substances and this is 
what he attempts to show with the examples in [D], i.e., we are justified in going by analogy from 
all spiritual to all corporeal substances. Leibniz says elsewhere, Ônature, as is her custom, gives us 
several visible examples to help us work out what she keeps hiddenÕ (G.III.340: WFNS.204). [A] 
bolsters this point by implicitly suggesting the Ôprinciple of uniformityÕ (PU), which states that 
(when Leibniz makes it explicit) Ôall the time and everywhere everythingÕs the same as hereÕ 
(G.III.343: WFNS.220-221). We can go by analogy to discover not only truths about the nature 
of created substances, but even about the ultimate substance: God.     
As Paul Lodge (2014) has shown5, an interesting aspect of LeibnizÕs argumentation for this new 
conception of substance is emphasised in his correspondence with the Cartesian Burchard De 
Volder. In at least eleven letters, De Volder pushed Leibniz for an a priori proof to demonstrate 
that the essence of substance is active force. However, contrary to RobefÕs claim that LeibnizÕs 
concept of active force purely follows Ôthe a priori type of objective truthÕ, Leibniz never 
                                                             
5 I am grateful to Lodge for allowing me to see this work before publication and for a helpful discussion concerning 
LeibnizÕs work. The following quotes from the Leibniz-De Volder Correspondence and Of Nature Itself are from LodgeÕs 
article.  
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attempted to and instead insisted Ôthe fact is demonstrated a posterioriÕ. He tells him ÔI do not 
see how you could have doubts about the internal tendency to change in things since we are 
taught that there are changes in things by our experience of the phenomena, as well as from the 
inside, where the operations of the mind themselves exhibit changesÕ (LDV.279; cf. 157, 277, 
and 307). That Leibniz considers this so obvious lends credit to my claim about the role of [D] 
and [E] above. Leibniz can then reason from our experience of internal activity to the nature of 
all substances via the application of the PU. Biran would have been aware that Leibniz uses such 
a method from works such as On Nature Itself. Leibniz there writes:  
if we attribute an inherent force to our mind, a force for producing immanent actions, 
orÉ a force for acting immanently, thenÉ it is reasonable to suppose that the same 
force would be found in other souls or forms, orÉ in the nature of substances Ð unless 
someone were to think that, in the natural world accessible to us, our minds alone are 
active, or that all power for acting immanently, and... all power for acting vitally is joined 
to an intellect, assertions that are neither confirmed by any rational arguments, nor can 
they be defended except by distorting the truth. (G.IV.510: AG.161)  
What is especially interesting about LeibnizÕs two-step argument from experience is that he uses 
it in two ways relevant for BiranÕs purposes: First, in texts such as Of Nature Itself and the 
Conversation between Theodore and Ariste (see G.IV.589: AG.265), he uses it to argue against passive 
substance and occasionalism. Crucially, for Biran, the argument is used to allow ontological space 
for the willing subject. However, second, as Pauline Phemister (2004) has shown, Leibniz uses it 
in relation to English empiricist philosophers such as Locke. This use is vital because BiranÕs 
work was an attempt to reform empiricism (see Hallie 1959). BiranÕs central methodological 
claim is that the true metaphysics or science of principles must start from introspection, i.e., the 
examination of sens intime. He writes that Ôinternal observation is nothing other than the present 
application of this sense to that which is in us, or which properly belongs to us, and whatever 
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idealism may say, it is by focusing upon its testimony, and not by raising ourselves up to the 
heavens or by descending into the abyss, on the wings of the senses or of imagination, that we 
may contemplate our thought and know our natureÕ (OMB.VI.5). The fundamental mistake of 
the empiricists has been, he argues, to leave the analysis of inner sense incomplete and to 
confuse it with the outer senses. His work is intended to be a development of an empiricism of 
inner sense which would entail the discovery of primitive facts that are not obtained by any 
process of deduction, but immediately experienced whenever we are conscious. As Phemister 
explains, LeibnizÕs use of the PU can also be seen as a reformation of Lockean empiricism. It will 
therefore be of profit to this discussion to summarize some of PhemisterÕs main points regarding 
LeibnizÕs reformation of the Lockean PU, to show how Biran adopted and amplified this 
reformation.  
Like both Leibniz and Biran, LockeÕs empiricism relies on a PU and he Ôassumes that our sensory 
experience provides the standard upon which our understanding of the indivisible microscopic 
and the macroscopic aspects of the universe should be modelledÕ (2004: 201). For Locke, this 
principle is applied solely to primary qualities. We can divide a grain of wheat however many 
times we like, the remaining parts will always possess such qualities. For Locke, as for Leibniz 
and Biran, analogy plays a vital role in his philosophical method: ÔWe canÕ, he writes, Ôgo no 
farther than particular Experience informs us of matter of fact, and by Analogy to guess what 
Effects the like Bodies are, upon other tryals, like to produceÕ (EHU.4.3.29; cf. NE.473). 
However, when Leibniz appropriates LockeÕs PU, he relies, Phemister shows, on a 
fundamentally different conception of experience Ôthat demands a far wider applicationÕ (2004: 
204). When Locke uses the word ÔexperienceÕ he uses it as a noun Ð it is that by which we receive 
ideas, but it is the ideas themselves rather than experience as such that interest him. In contrast, 
Leibniz uses it as a verb in the active voice. As Phemister shows ÔLeibnizÕs focus isÉ on the 
nature of experience itself. And this experiential state is one in which sensation and reflection are 
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combined so that, through self-awareness he can understand himself as a thinking and perceiving 
being who is embodied and has sense-experiences of a world outsideÕ (2004: 207). This is a 
radical move, one which, in fact, is not given its full due if merely referred to as a reformation of 
empiricism. It is rather a true Ôphilosophy of experienceÕ which attempts to go beyond 
rationalism and empiricism to do justice to both the evidence of our external senses as well as 
the inner activity of our minds. Such reflection reveals to us our nature as a spontaneous and 
active being embodied in a material world governed by mechanical laws. This is the essential 
connection by which we are shown, returning to the epigraph, Ôthat corporeal machines serve 
minds and what is providence in a mind is fate in a bodyÕ (E.446: L.593). Most importantly, we 
can see from this discussion that rather than provide a philosophy in the final analysis opposed 
to BiranÕs, LeibnizÕs project from the perspective of the philosophy of experience is almost 
exactly BiranÕs project.  
Patrice Vermeren has written that Ôthe reading Biran proposes of LeibnizÕs philosophy aims not 
at the simple reproduction of the doctrine, but constitutes an enjeu dcsif for the elaboration of his 
thought in the agnostic field which opposes, under the Restauration, the sensualist heritage of 
the eighteenth century to the renascent French spiritualismÕ (1995: 45). I do not want to suggest, 
as Cousin did, that Biran found all his ideas in LeibnizÕs writings (FP.III.77), nor do I wish to 
deny that BiranÕs reading is more than a simple reproduction. What I do claim is that the aspects 
of LeibnizÕs philosophy Biran emphasizes are real elements and not distortions; real elements 
that Biran amplifies in novel and interesting ways. Therefore, he shows the fertility of thinking 
with this side of LeibnizÕs thought. To show the importance of these ampliative aspects of BiranÕs 
work, in ¤2 I discuss two crucial developments which reveal the distinctive character of 
Biranianism: [1] his defence of Ôactive forceÕ contra Hume; and [2] his theory of the virtual. 
These two developments map respectively onto the order of progression of LeibnizÕs two-step 
methodology from the philosophy of experience.  
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2. MAINE DE BIRANÕS AMPLIATIVE LEIBNIZIANISM 
 
2.1 Leibniz Contra Hume 
LeibnizÕs theory of force and his reconceptualization of experience as a verb in the active voice 
are vital for Biran because he regards active force as the consciousness of effort voulu. The 
experience of force or willed effort reveals our very sense of self to ourselves. As Ravaisson wrote, 
for Biran, Ôto be, to act, to willÕ are just different terms to refer to Ôone and the same thingÕ 
(RR.16). By beginning our deductions from the concrete fact of this force, Biran believes we have 
a proper foundation for metaphysics, freed from the abstractions of the empiricist and idealist 
schools. However, unlike Leibniz, Biran lived in a post-Humean context and the idea that we 
could obtain a meaningful concept of ÔforceÕ or Ônecessary connexionÕ from introspection had 
received a powerful and by now widely-known attack from the Scottish empiricist. Biran engages 
with HumeÕs arguments in his incomplete Fondements de la psychologie (circa 1813) and considers 
HumeÕs work as merely an important stepping-stone on the route to the true conception of force 
found via inner sense. BiranÕs arguments are careful and challenging and he showed in a more 
striking way than any of his contemporaries that the question Ôis a Leibnizian spiritualist 
metaphysics possible after Hume?Õ could be answered in the affirmative.   
In ¤VII of HumeÕs Enquiry, he famously argues that there are three possible sources for the idea 
of force or necessary connection: first, external objects; second, reflection on the operation of 
our minds; and, third, divine power. In the first two cases, Hume shows, we only ever experience 
distinct events, but, try as we might, we would never perceive the necessary connection between 
any two events. The third, divine power, is dismissed as a theoretical Ôfairy landÕ. Hume provides 
a Ôsceptical solutionÕ to this problem: the idea of necessary connection is derived from the 
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Ôcustomary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendantÉ the 
connexionÉ which we feel in the mindÕ (HE.75). This is a meaningful idea, because it is derived 
from an impressionÑthe customary transition from one mental event to anotherÑbut 
ultimately an imperfect idea, because it is not derived from ÔforcesÕ or Ônecessary connectionsÕ 
themselves. Such forces, Hume believes, will remain forever hidden from view and a scientia 
capable of discovering the true essence of power or force is impossible. 
Biran considered it HumeÕs achievement to have shown that we cannot discover force in 
external objects, but finds HumeÕs argument to be misguided when he attempts to extend it to 
the evidence of sens intime. Hume, like Locke and Condillac, failed to adequately distinguish 
between what Locke referred to as ideas of ÔsensationÕ and ÔreflectionÕ; Locke introduced Ôideas 
of reflectionÕ only to leave us with an imperfect analysis. However, once this distinction is 
clarified we can understand that it is only through the feeling of the I, the primitive fact of 
consciousness identified with effort, that we can Ôrecognize the real character of the principle of all 
metaphysicsÕ (OMB.VII.159). Biran agrees with Hume that we could only discover the influence 
of the will on the body through experience, but argues that we must recognise a fundamental 
distinction between an act of will and a mere sense impression. This distinction is a Ôtrue 
antithesisÕ: the antithesis between activity and passivity, which he regards as equivalent to the 
antithesis between freedom and necessity (OMB.VII.162). HumeÕs error is to conceive the 
subject as merely subjected and to subsume the active will under impressions. Consequently, Hume 
has closed himself off from any possible recognition of the fact under investigation. I shall now 
turn to how Biran applies this to HumeÕs arguments. 
Perhaps the most crucial element of HumeÕs argument for Biran is the claim that if we were able 
to perceive a causal connection or power, we would be able to ÔforeseeÕ the effect in the energy 
of its cause. Biran responds that it is not a question of ÔforeseeingÕ, but rather feeling (bien sentir). 
He claims that Ôat the moment when the will, the motive force, goes to exercise itself, when an 
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effort is determined, and indeed the first willed effort (effort voulu), it is necessary that the energy of 
the cause carries with it a sort of presentiment or vision (prvoyance) of success; otherwise there 
would only be simple desire and no willingÕ (ibid).  To clarify Biran here and to understand what 
he means by this presentiment or prvoyance of success, we must advance in two stages: we need [1] 
to introduce the distinction between what he calls desire and will; and, [2] further explain his 
concept of effort voulu. First, Biran argues that desire and will are two distinct but often-confused 
faculties. To clarify this distinction he puts forward an imagined hypothesis: his version of 
CondillacÕs statue. BiranÕs statue enjoys only the sense of smell and the ability either to inhale or 
not in accordance with its will. Placing odorous flowers next to the statue would not suffice for 
the statue to smell the scent of the flowers. The statue must inhale to smell anything; if it is not 
inhaling, the scent of the flower will not be sensed. Imagine the flowers are next to the statueÕs 
nose and whenever the statue inhales, it smells the pleasant scent of the jasminium polyanthum. As 
this smell is Ôconstantly conjoinedÕ with the statueÕs active willing, the statue will believe it is the 
scentÕs cause. An outside observer would not see this connection. She would believe the statue 
was only passively receiving the flowersÕ scent. In truth, the statue is neither merely passive nor 
fully active. It is active insofar as it inhales, passive insofar as it receives the odour. However, as 
the statue has never experienced the two separately, it cannot make this distinction. Now let us 
imagine that the flowers have been removed from the statueÕs olfactory organ and that it chooses 
again to inhale, wishing to smell the Jasmine. This time the smell will be absent and after 
attempting and failing to smell it a few times, it will realise it was not the scentÕs true cause after 
all. The scent of Jasmine has become the object of desire, rather than the effect of willing. Our desires 
more often than not precede our willings, but they are distinct from them and are not their 
sufficient conditions.  
To understand the second step of BiranÕs argument and to clarify what he means by effort voulu 
we must now consider HumeÕs argument that if there were a necessary connection between the 
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ÔmovementÕ of the arm and the conscious Ôwilling-to-moveÕ the arm, it would be impossible to 
have the latter without the former. A true cause necessitates its effect. However, in the case of 
the man with paralysis of the arm, Hume argues, we have precisely this occurrence. The man 
wills the armÕs movement, yet the arm does not move. BiranÕs response again depends on the 
distinction between desire and will (see GH.239). In inner sense the Ôwilling the movement of the 
armÕ, on the one hand, and the Ômovement of the armÕ, on the other, are not experienced at 
distinct moments of time, but felt simultaneously. If the willing did not carry with it the feeling 
of success, there would be no feeling of effort voulu; rather, there would be only desire. This 
illuminates BiranÕs claim that there is a Ôfeeling of successÕ which accompanies the willing, rather 
than a ÔforeseeingÕ. To expect a ÔforeseeingÕ is to confuse desire with effort voulu. If we were to 
take the case of an amputee who has had their arm removed, there would be two possibilities. 
First, if the amputee attempted to move their arm, forgetting the operation had taken place, and 
moved only the residual limb, there would still be effort voulu. It would be a mistake in memory, 
not a mistake in feeling (See Hallie, 1959: 89). Second, if there were no effect at all, no 
movement, not even in the residual limb, there would be no effort voulu, but desire alone. This 
concurs with BiranÕs claim that the individual who has never once voluntarily moved any of their 
limbs, could never have experienced effort voulu. Experience is necessarily embodied. In sum, 
Biran claims that Hume is wrong to conclude that we do not have an experience of power or 
necessary connection because he has mistaken desire for will. Unless there is some relation 
between a willing and the feeling of an effectÑeven if this is the movement of a residual limb 
rather than the intended armÑthere is no willing, only desire: willing is necessarily connected to 
its effect, desire is not. The essential point is that examples where desires do not lead necessarily 
to effects cannot be used as exceptions to the necessary connection between willings and their 
effects.  
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For Biran, willingÑthe primitive fact of consciousness in which the true concept of force is 
discoveredÑreveals to us a Ôhyper-organic forceÕ that is ontologically inseparable from Ôorganic 
resistanceÕ. Although, Ôhyper-organic forceÕ is distinct from the body, it is only realised in relation 
to it. Unless there is organic resistance, there is no hyper-organic force. In addition, it is only 
through this relationship that our feeling of personal existence emerges. This feeling raises 
human consciousness above the mere sensitive being of animals. It is responsible for apperception 
as opposed to mere perception. Biran is clear that he understands apperception in LeibnizÕs sense, 
perception cum reflexione conjuncta (OMB.VI.104), yet where Leibniz saw a difference in degree, Biran 
sees a difference in kind; the force responsible for apperception is not the same kind of force as 
the kind responsible for sensibility. This distinction amounts to a real distinction between 
physiology and psychology. Animal experience reduced to material actions and reactions 
dependent on the external senses alone would amount to little more than a Ôvague and confused 
feeling of existenceÕ. This is the empire of destiny in which no being can rise above the Ôblind 
determinations of instinctÕ (OI.I.225). Biran calls the force essential for human apperception 
Ôhyper-organicÕ to distinguish it from the organic forces of the physiological world. It is a sui 
generis force dependent on nothing exterior to itself for its activation and is the source of our free 
will and inner sense of identity. Even though this force has an ontological reality distinct from 
organic forces, it impossible to experience it except in relation to organic force; the two forces 
together form for us an essential and indivisible correlation (OMB.VII.125). Nonetheless, as 
highlighted by the epigraph, hyper-organic force takes a superior and providential role.  
Returning to HumeÕs Enquiry, anyone who knows this work well will wonder how Biran 
responds to HumeÕs argument that if we really were able to observe a connection between our 
volitions and corporeal movements, we would be intimately aware of the movements of the 
nerves and muscles responsible for the chain of events that leads from the volition to the armÕs 
movements. Again, Biran believes that this line of attack follows from the misconceived 
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assimilation of inner to outer. It is true that we do not observe this connection, but this is 
because it involves two heterogeneous kinds of knowledge. The fact that we cannot represent 
these effects of external movement does not, he argues, prevent us from assuredly experiencing 
the feeling of our Ôprimordial powerÕ or what he calls the Ôempire of the will over its organsÕ. He 
asks: 
What species of analogy is there between the representative knowledge of position, of 
the interplay and the functions of our organs, such as an anatomist or physiologist can 
know them, and the inner feeling which corresponds to these functions, and also the 
internal knowledge of the parts localized in the continuous resistance of which we spoke 
previously? How could one not see the opposition that occurs between these two kinds 
of knowledge, an opposition such that at the very moment when the will moves an 
organ, if the instruments of motility could represent themselves instead of being felt, or 
be inwardly apperceived, the will could never arise? (OI.I.262)    
If we were able to observe all of the internal actions and reactions inside the retina, we could not 
experience the colours. This is why the Ôhidden springs and principlesÕ are withdrawn from view 
of external senses. However, this does not mean we have no feeling of power or causal force, 
but rather that we can only know this force through sens intime. The real reason for HumeÕs 
ignorance, Biran believed, is that it is exactly the development of habit to which Hume attributed 
the origin of the idea of cause that conceals the feeling of effort from many of our actions. To 
the extent that our actions are undertaken more easily, less consciously, and more through the 
influence of habit, the determinations of inner sense fade and the impressions of external senses 
dominate. However, we should not be misled by habit. Real reflection on the feeling of sens intime 
proves Hume indisputably wrong. For Biran, HumeÕs real success was (even though he was 
misled through his confusion of inner and outer sense, on the one hand, and will and desire, on 
the other) his careful demonstration of the impossibility of deriving the idea of force from outer 
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sense, which showed conclusively that it must be located in the operations of inner sense. For 
this ÔHume deserves our gratitudeÕ (OMB.VII.167).  
To clarify further what he means by effort voulu, Biran compares his theory to Johann Jakob 
EngelÕs. Engel argued that we discover force through the exercise of muscular sensation when 
attempting to resist an exterior force. If I attempt to lift a heavy box, I grasp the idea of force 
from attempting to overcome its weight. For Engel, HumeÕs error was to attempt to obtain the 
idea of force from the wrong senses (sight, sound, touch etc.), force appears to muscular 
sensation alone. The problem with his argument is that Hume has already addressed it (HE.67 
n.1). He argues that although we experience some feeling of resistance, it is too obscure and we 
consequently attribute it to too many objects Ôwhere we never can suppose this resistance of 
existence of force to take placeÕ, such as in inanimate matter or even the supreme being. Biran 
was frequently misrepresented for simply attempting to defend force as Engel did (See Cousin, 
EE.65-66, and Renouvier, ECG.156). But this ignores the extra distinction Biran makes, not just 
between a foreign body and my body, but also between my body and hyper-organic force. In the 
experience of lifting a box, there are two essential distinctions: first, the distinction between my 
hyper-organic force which initiates the action and my body which resists my initiation according 
to its inertia, but nevertheless obeys my commands; and, second, the distinction between my 
body and the resistance of the box as a foreign body. Consequently, Biran argues that while 
Engel takes a step in the right direction, by attributing this feeling of ÔeffortÕ to sens intime, he fails 
to go far enough. Engel derives the experience of effort from the mediate feeling of muscular 
sensation resisting an exterior object. If the sensation were only experienced mediately, Hume 
would be right that we cannot accurately attribute this sensation to a particular source. However, 
we do not experience a mediate feeling of effort, but rather an immediate one and it is only by 
recognising this vital fact that we can overcome HumeÕs problem: 
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The true origin (I do not say essence) of the idea that we attach to the word force, consists 
in the immediate power of the will to grasp and determine the inertial or resistant force 
proper to the muscular organs, and thereby to enter into a conflict of actions. In the 
sense of M. Engel, it follows from the complication or from the conflict of our force 
with the alien exterior force, either that the latter is overcome, or that ours is 
momentarily suspended or as if paralysed by the object. In my sense, the muscular inertia 
is always surmounted, and the hyper-organic force, far from being relaxed [dtendue] or as 
if paralysed by this resistance, believes [croit] in energy and activity, to the degree that this 
resistance increases. (OMB.VII.169-70) 
 
The key distinction is that the muscular sensation is still presented to us, in the same way as the 
impressions of our external senses; thus, EngelÕs theory does not emphasise the essential activity 
that cannot be dissociated from the feeling of effort. To understand this feeling we need only 
reflect on our active exercise of willing (OMB.VII.118-9). A person born paralyzed, who has 
never moved any of their organs willingly, could not understand this feeling of effort, just as a 
person born blind could never understand the feeling of sight. Biran extends this thesis further 
and argues that the paralyzed person mentioned above would not even experience self-
consciousness, as self-consciousness and the activity of willing are identical (ibid); even our 
passive sensory impressions are only knowable in contrast to our essential activity, just as we 
could not know shadows without light. At this point the importance of LeibnizÕs metaphysics of 
forces becomes clear. First, like LeibnizÕs force which is Ôhalf-way between a faculty and an 
action, and contains in itself a certain effort, or conatusÕ (UL.VI.526: WFNS.32-33), BiranÕs effort 
voulu requires no impetus from outside, it contains its action within itself; Ôwe apperceive and 
reproduce it at every instantÕ (OMB.VII.121). The action is both indivisible and instantaneous. 
This is in contrast to our sensible impressions for which we are not responsible. Second, for 
Biran, we complete LockeÕs incomplete analysis of the distinction between ideas of sensation and 
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reflection, when we understand it as a distinction Hallie (1959: 34) sums up as between 
Ôpresentation toÕ and Ôliving throughÕ. Ideas of sensation are presented to us, while we live through 
ideas of reflection. The first are received passively, the latter are the result of our agency: LockeÕs 
analysis of inner sense is therefore reconceived according to LeibnizÕs theory of force. Again, we 
return to previous discussion of experience as understood as a noun, on the one hand, and as an 
active verb, on the other. The distinction between EngelÕs and BiranÕs theories is that while 
Engel was unable to move past understanding experience as presented to, BiranÕs analysis of hyper-
organic force completes the theory of inner sense and moves us to experience as living through. 
This analysis has deep metaphysical consequences because it means that instead of having to 
think causation in terms of customary transitions from one event to the next, we can obtain a 
true understanding of agent causation based on our internal activity. BiranÕs next step, following 
LeibnizÕs two-step methodology, is to show we can apply this new understanding of causation to 
our understanding of nature.  
2.2 The Virtual 
Once we realise we must discover the Ôscience of principlesÕ by reasoning from the introspective 
view and not the GodÕs eye view, Biran insists that the true importance of LeibnizÕs system is 
unveiled: ÔThe fixed point being given, thought takes to the air, and, on the wings of Leibniz, 
swiftly flies from pole to pole, or ascends, with the calmness of reflection, through each link in 
this great chain of being, of which the system of monads offers so great and so magnificent a 
representationÕ (OMB.XI-I.149). Biran asks us to consider DescartesÕs famous Ôpiece of waxÕ 
argument. Descartes asks Ôwhat remains of the wax when all the sensible qualities have been 
changed or removed?Õ His answer is Ôpure extensionÕ alone (AT.VII.31: CSM.II.20). This 
extension involves no power of its own, and to activate its ÔpotentialÕ (flexibility and 
changeability), it must receive excitation from outside: from GodÕs force. DescartesÕs theory of 
extension is, Biran argues, really a scholastic theory of Ôbare facultiesÕ. Consequently, it is Leibniz 
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who provides the true answer to the question Ôwhat remains of the wax after every secondary 
quality has been removed?Õ The Ôdirect and true responseÕ is that force remains. Force is the 
proper ground of our being, which exists either as actualised, in particular determinate qualities, or 
virtually. When there is no self-consciousness, i.e., effort voulu, we do not become nothing, or a 
naked faculty waiting for excitation from outside, our being remains virtual; there is always a 
tendency to action. Biran believes that this distinction found in Leibniz helps to clarify the 
question of innate ideas obscured by Descartes and Locke. Our innate ideas and modes are 
virtual forces which ground our proper being. They are tendencies to action which subsist even 
when not actualised in consciousness or effort voulu. This theory of virtuality is crucial to BiranÕs 
theory of the self. This is because he is highly critical of the Cartesian inference from the 
existence of thought to the claim that there must be some sort of passive receptacleÑ
substanceÑin which all of these individual thoughts are united. Yet, Biran is no bundle theorist, 
there is a unity to the self, but the unity comes from these virtual tendencies: tendencies which 
are not passive or bare possibilities, but rather Ôhalf way between power and actÕ. As he explains 
in his 1817 Anthropologie:  
In us, and only in ourselves, the cause, the productive force of the movements or free 
acts executed by the organs, is immediately manifested, both as phenomenon or fact of 
inner sense in willed and felt effort, and as [a] notion or conception of the active being in 
its essence, or of virtual absolute force which exists before the manifestation, and which 
remains the same after, even though its exercise is suspended. The phenomenon and the 
reality, being and appearance coincide therefore in the consciousness of the I, identical 
with the immediate feeling of force, or cause, which operates by the willÕ. (OI.III.412)   
Leibniz argued that our knowledge of necessary and eternal truths, gained through our reflective 
acts, causes us to rise above simple animals and brings us closer to God. Biran argues that 
Leibniz was correct in inferring that it is from our reflective acts that we gain knowledge of 
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necessary truths, and these truths raise us above simple animals; however, he was wrong to infer 
knowledge of abstract ideas6. Biran believes that we do not gain such abstract knowledge, but 
rather concrete knowledge of the virtualities, tendencies, or forms of the human mind, which are 
concrete conditions of the possibility of knowledge. The ÔconditionsÕ Biran discovers through his 
introspective reflective analysis, such as substance, cause, unity, and identity, are what he calls simple 
reflective ideas and sound prima facie like Kantian categories. In the process of forming Ôgeneral 
abstract ideasÕ, one experiences a number of similar external objects, for example, books, and 
one removes everything unique to the individual books, leaving only the general characteristic or 
idea of ÔbookÕ. However, by doing so, Biran argues, we have eliminated the reality of any 
individual book. The idea has become a mere logical concept and does not reflect the reality of 
any individual thing. Unlike general abstract ideas, which refer to characteristics common to 
many particulars, the simple reflective ideas are always individual and simple. Like Kant, Biran 
believes these concepts are not abstracted from sensible things, but are rather heterogeneous to 
external sensibility. These simple concepts are discovered once we abstract from all sensible 
perception: 
The I which exists or apperceives itself internally, as one, as simple, as identical, is not itself 
abstracted from those sensations such as may be of the common or of the general in 
themselves, except insofar as it abstracts itself by the act of internal apperception, which 
distinguishes and separates up to a certain point the individual or the one from the 
                                                             
6 Biran is wrong to claim that Leibniz defended bare abstract ideas. In the New Essays Leibniz says the Ôthorniest 
bramblesÕ of the Scholastics Ôdisappear in a flash if one is willing to banish abstract entitiesÕ (NE 217-218). Biran 
comes close to LeibnizÕs theory; he argues that the ÔformsÕ of the mind that exist as virtual tendencies underlying our 
conscious thoughts are what provide the unity of our personal identity. However, Biran limits these forms to his 
own ÔcategoriesÕ: substance, cause, unity, and identity. He fails to recognise that for Leibniz all our forms or ideas 
have this kind of pre-existent reality as virtualities. Whether or not we are able to clearly and distinctly express these 
ideas, they always play an essential and constitutive role in our thought. Using a nice example Leibniz says Ôwe use 
these maxims without having them explicitly in mind. It is rather like the way in which one has implicitly in mind the 
suppressed premises in enthymemes, which are omitted in our thinking of the argument as well as in our outward 
expression of itÕ (NE.76). Biran comes close to recognising the full novelty of LeibnizÕs own theory of ideas (which 
makes a distinction between bare abstract ideas and efficacious Platonic ideas, i.e., ideas qua forces), but then ends 
up criticising Leibniz for a mistake he does not make. This is surprising since Biran will later put the distinction 
between Descartes and Leibniz clearly as a distinction between Aristotelianism and Platonism: ÔDescartesÕs system is 
linked to Aristotelianism by the nature of itsÉ purely modifiable passive substance, endowed with receptivity, 
andÉ LeibnizÕs system is linked to Platonism by the principle of forceÕ (OP.III.153-154). 
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collective and from the multiple; the active force or the cause, from the effect produced; 
the action from passion; in a word the subject which makes the effort, from the term 
which resists and which undergoes diverse modifications. The I is therefore truly 
abstrahens in its reflective action, and not abstractus.7 (OMB.VII.200) 
BiranÕs categories are the inseparable characteristics of effort voulu discoverable from reflection. 
Our primitive metaphysical ideas, such as cause, substance, and unity, have meaning only insofar 
as they are derived from this introspective analysis.  
With the theory of virtual force in place, Biran claims that Ô[t]he reformed metaphysics no longer 
allows two great classes of being, entirely separated from each other and excluding all 
intermediaries, but one and the same chain embracing and bonding all of the beings of creationÕ 
(OMB.XI-I.151). He agrees with Descartes that there must be a distinction between the organic 
and the Ôhyper-organicÕ, but he does not believe that this distinction must lead us to a separation 
between two heterogeneous substances. Virtual force is the metaphysical ground of nature; it is 
what remains when the sensible qualities of the wax change. We can, Biran argues, perform a 
kind of Ônatural inductionÕ from our experience of causal activity, to true causal action all 
throughout nature. We know from BiranÕs Journal intime that his friends Ampre and Cousin had 
insisted to him that such natural induction was problematic and Ampre convinced him that 
there is Ôbetween the individual feeling of the causality of the I, and the belief or necessary 
universal notion of cause, an abyss that cannot be crossed by recourse to analysis alone, or by 
analogy or induction.Õ Nonetheless, Biran stuck to his defence of the PU and maintained:   
it is natural that we should perceive, or that we should conceive things which do not 
depend on the I, in the manner in which we exist, and under the form or idea which 
constitutes our individual existence. We exist as an I, or as an individual person only 
insofar as we are causes; it is therefore natural that we could conceive of nothing, or 
                                                             
7 The distinction comes from KantÕs 1770 Inaugural Dissertation, the only one of KantÕs works Biran read. 
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realize it outside of ourselves except in the same way: ÒI would like to knowÓ, said 
Leibniz, Òhow we could conceive of the idea of being if we did not, as beings ourselves, 
find being within usÓ [NE.86]. I extend this principle and I ask how we could not 
conceive that there are causes, or a single cause alone throughout, when we exist only as 
causes. (JI.I.226-27; cf. NE.473) 
 
Biran cannot admit the principle of causality as a necessary truth throughout nature, but as this 
shows, he accepts that. Even with this admitted, he believes we nevertheless cannot consider 
causality in any other way than by analogy with our effort voulu. It remains the safest ground for 
our reflections on the metaphysics of nature.   
I conclude this section by emphasising two main problems involved in BiranÕs developments of 
LeibnizÕs metaphysics. First, by postulating a difference not in degree but in kind between the sui 
generis nature of his hyper-organic force and the lesser organic forces, Biran introduces a lacuna in 
nature between physiology and psychology that is almost as severe as DescartesÕs. Yet this does 
not concern him. Partly, this is because he claims to have replaced DescartesÕ heterogeneous 
substances with a metaphysics of forces. However, even so, Biran still argues for a troubling 
heterogeneity within these forces, between the sui generis hyper-organic forces, on the one hand, 
and the organic forces determined by the laws of dynamics, on the other. The postulation of one 
ontological type outside of space and the constraints of the physical, and another within 
reproduces the interaction problem in its entirety and Biran has no recourse to PEH to escape it. 
This primitive duality is made evident by the primitive fact of consciousness and cannot be 
rejected, but also cannot be explained. However, a second, perhaps more serious, problem stems 
from the fact that he starts his natural induction from the reflective experience of spontaneous 
and active embodied beings endowed with inner sense and infers from this the existence of 
forces throughout nature. Nonetheless, there is a stark difference in kind between the hyper-
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organic force of human beings and the organic and mechanical forces in the rest of nature. It 
seems that for Biran all the time and everywhere things are not the same as they are here. 
Consistently followed, BiranÕs use of the PU should have led to panpsychism and this was 
recognized and implemented by later Biran-influenced spiritualists such as Ravaisson and 
Boutroux. For this reason, highlighting BiranÕs fecund metaphysical suggestions is more 
interesting than criticising his systematic inconsistencies. He was, first and foremost, a 
psychologist and his metaphysical speculations of cause, substance, and existence only began to 
be of explicit concern to him in the last two decades of his life. His was not a final polished 
systematic theory and most of our sources he had not intended to publish. What is most 
important is the influence his essays on these ideas had for later generations and, therefore, the 
resources they provided for those philosophers more explicitly concerned with such fundamental 
issues in metaphysics and epistemology.   
 
3. MAINE DE BIRANÕS LEIBNIZ AND VICTOR COUSIN 
 
Vermeren argued that we can only understand the nineteenth-century readings of Leibniz and 
Biran in the context of the Ôstruggle for the conquest and maintenance of the philosophical 
hegemony of university spiritualism in the emerging modern constitutional stateÕ (1987: 167). In 
this final section, I argue that the 1819 Exposition played a foundational role in the creation of 
this situation. This is because the articleÕs most cutting critical argument was not in truth aimed 
at LeibnizÕs philosophy (and, as Biran must have known, it would have not successfully hit its 
target if it were), but rather at the young professor Cousin. The professor who would, after 
BiranÕs death, gain an all-encompassing control over the direction of FranceÕs philosophical 
education and be instrumental in the creation of a national philosophy: eclectic spiritualism. The 
29 
 
critiques in the Exposition showed that the system Cousin was developing is fundamentally 
flawed.  
The story of CousinÕs life is an extraordinary journey from rags to riches. Although born into 
abject poverty in 1792, by 1830 he had become a philosopher king who would determine the 
hegemony of his spiritualist philosophy. As Jules Simon wrote: ÔThe 1830 Revolution, which 
made Louis-Philippe king of France, made Cousin king of philosophers. But Louis-Philippe was 
only a constitutional king, Cousin was an absolute kingÕ8. Simon also tells us that Cousin 
considered FranceÕs philosophy instructors his Ôphilosophical regimentÕ and that Ôhe had every 
hold over this regimentÕ (1888: 98; cf. 116). However, when Biran wrote the 1819 Exposition, 
Cousin did not enjoy such absolute power; he was, in BiranÕs mind, a talented young professor 
with the potential to guide French philosophy from sensualism to spiritualism. Despite being too 
Ôhot-headedÕ, he was FranceÕs greatest hope for fulfilling the hopes expressed by Stal (JI.II.303). 
We know from BiranÕs Journal that from around 1816 Biran and Cousin met frequently, that 
Cousin was a member of BiranÕs Ômetaphysical societyÕ, that Biran attended some of CousinÕs 
lectures, and that they discussed their philosophical systems, their metaphysics, substance, and 
the absolute in great detail9. Therefore, CousinÕs philosophy was well known to Biran. But why 
would Biran publish a critique of CousinÕs philosophy under the pretence of a critique of 
Leibniz? My hypothesis is based on three main claims: [1] CousinÕs character prevented Biran 
from wanting to name the true aim of this critique; [2] Biran was enough of a scholar to 
recognize that the critique did not affect Leibniz; and, [3] Biran knew and cared enough about 
CousinÕs philosophy to recognize that his argument fundamentally undermines it. Although this 
does not amount to conclusive proof, nonetheless, even if I am wrong about the intention of the 
author, we can be certain that Cousin and many of his contemporaries read it as such and this is 
                                                             
8 La philosophie et lÕenseignement official de la philosophie, archives privs, fonds Jules Simon 87 AP 16. Cited in Vermeren, 
1995: 176.  
9 See JI.I.126-127, 128-129, 131, 224. 228, 230, 235, 245, 247; JI.II.10, 23, 37, 120, 177, 185-6, 303 
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why the text plays such an important role in the struggle for the hegemony of CousinÕs 
spiritualism in the nineteenth century10. 
Starting with [1], although Cousin was not then a philosopher king, he had never been able to 
take criticism. As Simon tells us Ôeven in boyhood, Cousin had the habit and instinct of 
superiority; if a dispute arose, instead of arguing, he inveighed, wounded, crushed. This was a 
life-long characteristicÕ (1888: 110). Biran clearly recognised this (see JI.II.303). Biran was also 
nervous about publishing his work so published very little. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe 
he would not have wanted to suffer a public philosophical ÔcrushingÕ from Cousin. 
Consequently, [1] seems a fair assumption. To defend [2] and [3], we must turn to the critique 
itself.  
Biran states that there is a major problem with LeibnizÕs system because he argues for its truth 
from two separate and incompatible points of view. Biran ÔselectsÕ a part of LeibnizÕs philosophy, 
but this selection is necessary given the overall inconsistency of the system. On the one hand, 
Leibniz starts from the ÔintrospectiveÕ method and argues deductively from indubitable facts of 
inner sense; but, on the other, he argues from the ÔGodÕs eye viewÕ. From the first perspective, 
Biran claims, Leibniz provides us with a real foundation for metaphysics; however, from the 
second, he fares no better than the other rationalists whose systems collapse into pantheism. 
LeibnizÕs early meditations on the universal calculus caused him, Biran says, to search for the 
fundamental elements of reality through a process of analysis that would lead him to final 
abstracts. Through logic we are taken from the concrete to the abstract, and the abstract ideas of 
GodÕs understanding are found to be the source of all reality. When Leibniz derives his 
fundamental metaphysics using his faith in logic alone, he ends up in the same place as Spinoza 
and his monads become nothing more than the passive effects of GodÕs ideas. Biran argues that 
the central problem is that these two perspectives contradict one another. The ÔpsychologicalÕ 
                                                             
10 This reason is why LeibnizÕs philosophy was on the Ôfirst levelÕ in the French intellectual climate from at least 
1810, and not only from the 1850s as Moreau (2014) has attempted to show.   
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perspective emphasises the importance of force, freedom, and individuality, and the ÔGodÕs eye 
viewÕ eliminates all three.  
BiranÕs methodology is founded on what we might call the ÔPrinciple of the Primacy of 
Introspective ConstraintÕ (PIC). This asserts that there are fundamental introspective truths that 
cannot be denied without consequently denying existence. Any hypothesis that undermines these 
indubitable truths must therefore be rejected. Descartes claimed that Ô[t]he freedom of the will is self-
evidentÉ so evident that it must be counted among the first and most common notions that are 
innate in usÕ (AT.VIIIA.19: CSM.I.205-6). Biran agrees with this wholeheartedly, but, unlike 
Descartes, he is unwilling to let freedom be watered down by a compatibilist theory that would 
lead to the conclusion that God is the only true cause. We have an exclusive disjunction: either 
the individual is free and responsible for her actions, or God is the only true cause. BiranÕs 
adherence to the PIC means the latter disjunct is prohibited. Since LeibnizÕs ÔGodÕs eye viewÕ and 
the metaphysics of PEH would undermine the former disjunct, they must be abandoned. 
However, Biran does not see this rejection of PEH as altering LeibnizÕs doctrine Ôat its essenceÕ 
but rather as re-affirming it and establishing its full importance freed from rationalist dogmas.  
According to Biran, the ÔabsurdÕ nature of the a priori reasoning that led Descartes, Spinoza, 
Malebranche, and even Leibniz to determinism is shown by the fact that we begin reasoning 
from the free individual and then end up at a rationalist system that denies the existence of the 
free individual from which it began. Nonetheless, as it stands this is a weak argument. There is 
nothing wrong in principle with starting from a proposition we believe to be certain and then via 
a process of reasoning coming to find that this proposition is false or that it needs to be revised 
with regard to a fuller understanding. This is the Socratic method. It only becomes a problem if 
the conclusion can only be true if the original proposition is understood as necessarily true. Now 
we can turn to my defence of [2]: Leibniz need not be worried by this problem and Biran would 
have known it. This is because Leibniz does not accept the PIC. In the Theodicy, a text which 
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Biran owned and read, Leibniz agrees with Biran that DescartesÕs attempt to combine the inner 
experience of free will with GodÕs providence left his philosophy with an inexorable problem 
(T¤292). Indeed, this is one of the Ôtwo famous labyrinthsÕ: the one that Ôperplexes almost all the 
human raceÕ (G.VII.29: T.53). However, Leibniz did not agree that introspection provides us 
with proof of the existence of freedom (even if he did believe that it provides us with evidence 
of internal activity and spontaneity). He cites Pierre BayleÕs discussion of the weathervane and 
agrees that if an external force unfailingly moved us whenever we desired to move, we would 
believe ourselves to be the source of this action. The weathervane that always desired to move in 
the direction it was coincidently blown, would be, for Bayle and Leibniz, Ôpersuaded that it 
moved of itself to fulfil the desires which it conceivedÕ (T¤299). Leibniz claims that BayleÕs 
arguments are ÔexcellentÕ (T¤300). However, he believes they have no effect against the fact of 
freedom when it comes to the system of PEH, because the arguments for it are a priori and not 
from introspection. Given that Leibniz rejects introspective analysis in this case, his theory 
would not collapse under the weight of the PIC. Contrary to Biran and (as we shall see) Cousin, 
Leibniz argues that it is only from the rationalist proof of PEH and the independence of monads 
that we can defend free will, since only then can we regard individual beings as free from outside 
influence and therefore acting in complete accordance with their will (T¤300; cf. G.III.471).  
Turning to [3], we can now discuss why it affects Cousin in a way it does not Leibniz. Cousin 
agreed with Biran that psychology was the foundation of philosophy (FP.Ia.XII). He believed 
that faulty psychological analyses have been the cause of the major philosophical errors of 
eighteenth-century philosophy and these errors led to disastrous consequences. Sensualism led to 
scepticism by explicitly relativizing all knowledge to the individual. However, Kantian criticism 
led to a Ônew and originalÕ scepticism by relativizing reason to the phenomena of individuals11. 
                                                             
11 For Cousin, Fichte shows the necessary consequences of KantÕs philosophy. The I that posits itself, the world, 
and God Ôis the final degree of all subjectivity, the extreme and necessary term of KantÕs system, and, at the same 
time, its refutationÕ (FP.Ib.10). Clearly Cousin, despite what he claimed, did not have a good understanding of 
classical German philosophy. 
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Together these philosophies were responsible for an Ôage of criticism and destructionsÕ that Ôlet 
loose tempestsÕ. The aim of the nineteenth century, he insisted, should be Ôintelligent 
restorationsÕ (TBG.31). Such restorations would bring together the ideals of the French 
revolutionÑfreedom and equalityÑwith principles essential for the stability of the nation, such 
as immutable principles of truth, beauty, and goodness. CousinÕs recommendation was that 
philosophy should progress according to a principle of eclecticism Ôwhich judging with equity, 
and even with benevolence, all schools, borrows from them what they possess of the true, and 
neglects what in them is falseÕ (TBG.33); a statement which sounds as sensible as it is trite until 
we add that careful psychological analysis must act as said judge.  
Summarizing his 1817 and 1818 lectures, the lectures Biran would have attended and discussed 
with Cousin prior to the writing of the 1819 Exposition12, Cousin tells us that their main aim was 
to establish the truth of both ÔvoluntaryÕ and ÔrationalÕ facts in addition to the already well-
established ÔsensualÕ facts (FP.Ia.XIII-XIV). A complete psychological analysis will show the 
necessity of all three classes and that not one can be reduced to another. An example of a 
Ôrational factÕ, he claims, is that every effect must have a cause. Despite the ingenuity of HumeÕs 
arguments, Cousin thought it impossible, if we are honest to ourselves, to deny our belief in this 
principle. Honest reflection on our consciousness brings the principle with it, and shows that it is 
both universal and necessary, since an uncaused experience is unfathomable. As further 
reflection shows our experience is not principally caused by our volition, we must admit the 
existence of an external cause. Concurrently, we move from ontology to psychology and this is 
the reason why psychology is philosophyÕs essential foundation. The most important claim for 
Cousin is that the principal light for our phenomena comes from reason. No knowledge would 
be possible without it and Ôreason perceives itself, and the sensibility that envelops it, and the will 
that it compels without constrainingÕ (FP.Ia.XVII-XVIII). Furthermore, as Cousin argues that 
reflection on our reason shows us that these Ôrational factsÕ are universal and necessary, we are 
                                                             
12 Biran wrote this text between 10th April and 1st July 1819 (See JI.II.229-231).  
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led to infer the existence of a foundation for them that is also universal and necessary. This 
foundation cannot be our finite and contingent minds. As the universal and necessary principle is 
absolute, it leads us to an impersonal, absolute, universal, and necessary cause. ÔThe laws of 
intelligenceÕ, he tells us, Ôconstitute a separate world, which governs the visible world, presides 
over its movements, sustains and preserves it, but does not depend on itÕ (FP.Ia.XXIII). This, he 
claims, is the theory of the realm of ideas, introduced by Plato, but crowned and completed by 
LeibnizÕs theory of God or the Absolute13 (TBG.79, 89). For Cousin, God is:  
at once true and real, substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being 
substance only insofar as he is cause, and cause only insofar as he is substance, that is to 
say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence 
and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end and centre, at the summit of Being and at 
its lowest degree, infinite and finite together, finally triple, in a word, that is to say, at the 
same time God, nature, and humanity. In effect, if God is not every thing, he is nothing. 
(FP.Ia.XL)  
We can begin to see why BiranÕs argument in the 1819 Exposition affects Cousin in a way that it 
did not Leibniz. As I showed in ¤1, Biran argued that all Cartesian systems are led to pantheism 
by means of the following argument:  
1. God is the sole cause, and every other existing being is merely an effect of GodÕs power. 
2. It is Ôlogically certain that all effects are eminently or formally enclosed in their causeÕ 
(OMB.XI-I.142)  
3. Every created being is enclosed in God and there is no real distinction between God and 
nature.  
                                                             
13 As Manns and Madden (1990) show, when Cousin uses the term ÔAbsoluteÕ, he conceptualizes it in a way that is 
much closer to LeibnizÕs ÔAbsoluteÕ than SchellingÕs or HegelÕs. Indeed, Cousin frequently references LeibnizÕs use 
of the term in The True, the Beautiful, and the Good. (See NE.157, 158, D.II.17, 24, & T¤189).  
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It is difficult to see how Cousin could escape the consequences of this argument. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, he would be continually pestered by accusations of pantheism (See FP.Ib.18-23 & 
Vermeren 1995: 223-244). However, Biran did more than simply demonstrate that the eclectic 
system is pantheistic, he showed it is inconsistent. This is because, it asserts not only the 
existence of Ôrational factsÕ, which lead to the existence of an all-encompassing absolute; but also 
Ôvolitional factsÕ; facts which reveal our freedom and personality. For Cousin, unlike Leibniz, 
these volitional facts are principal facts of conscious experience (FP.Ia.XXV; cf. TBG.114). Our 
first Ôimmediate internal perceptionÕ presents us as free personalities and by reflecting on this free 
experience we are led to rational facts; nonetheless, CousinÕs further reflection on these facts 
leads him to a theory of the absolute which undermines the possibility of the evidence presented 
in the first immediate internal impression: volitional facts. The criticism is fatal for CousinÕs 
project because the evidence for the truth of free will is on the same level as the evidence for the 
truth of Ôuniversal and necessaryÕ principles, such as Ôevery effect has a causeÕ. If his argument 
turns out in the end to undermine the evidence for freedom, it follows that the evidence of the 
universal and necessary truths is similarly undermined. Yet, these were the premises on which the 
proof of the infinite being depends: the argumentÕs conclusion entails the falsehood of the 
premises. In addition, Cousin would not accept either the truth of Ôindividual freedomÕ or ÔGod 
as absoluteÕ alone, both are necessary. BiranÕs argument against the possibility of this 
reconciliation, at least upon the arguments that Cousin has provided, proves fatal for the latterÕs 
whole project. This then is my reason for [3] and completes my defence of the claim that the 
argument was always intended for Cousin.  
Although together [1], [2], and [3] provide a strong case for my hypothesis, one need not be 
convinced to see that Cousin understood it as an attack on his work, or at least as a serious threat 
to his philosophyÕs prominence. He was concerned with the establishment of his eclectic 
philosophical system as FranceÕs official philosophy, and did not want BiranÕs spiritualism to 
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emerge as an alternative. Nonetheless, he could only repress Biranianism for a definite period of 
time. It was a ticking time bomb that would eventually explode and leave his eclecticism in 
tatters. CousinÕs method of repression began when he inherited BiranÕs Ïuvre after his death. 
Despite the riches known to be contained within these manuscripts, he delayed publication for 
ten years, and then published at first only one volume; a volume he claimed (falsely) to contain 
BiranÕs thought in its entirety (FP.III.63). Vermeren (1987: 159) offers two reasons for this delay. 
First, Cousin wanted to retain the glory of being the philosopher who overturned eighteenth-
century sensualism; and, second, he feared that BiranÕs spiritualism would contest the hegemony 
of his own. As we have seen above, Cousin was right to be afraid and the Exposition required 
special treatment in his introduction to BiranÕs Îuvres posthumes. CousinÕs treatment proceeds in 
three steps. First, he shows Biran was wrong to claim that LeibnizÕs philosophy is fundamentally 
inconsistent. He insists that when Biran presents an absolute and universal spiritualism, freed 
from the universal and necessary principles of reason that support both his and LeibnizÕs 
spiritualisms, it is an incomplete philosophy. It is the commencement of a system but not a 
system properly speaking. Second, Cousin argues that his philosophy is more Leibnizian than 
BiranÕs. This is because Leibnizian apperception leads not only to the consciousness of the I qua 
force, but also to the awareness of the not-I. Then the awareness of the rational facts which are 
also part of the not-I, via CousinÕs method, leads us to the cause of causes. Here we reach not 
only Ôthe foundation of the monadology, but the monadology in its entirety, and perhaps also 
pre-established harmonyÕ Ð with CousinÕs important proviso added - Ôwell-understoodÕ 
(FP.III.80). Bringing the first two steps together, Cousin argues that PEH does not deny the 
action of monads and lead to pantheism, quite to the contrary, it contends that the I and the not-
I act together and modify each other according to their own actions governed by laws. Every 
being acts on every other being within limits. This well governed universal concordance is all 
PEH is supposed to suggest (FP.III.81). The scene is then set for CousinÕs attempt to properly 
reclaim Leibniz for his eclectic school:  
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it is necessary for my eclecticism to recognise and savour the eclectic direction found 
throughout all of LeibnizÕs works. To the degree that I advance, or believe to advance in 
philosophy, it seems to me that I see more clearly into the thought of this great man and 
all my progress consists in better understanding him. Maine de Biran, at the point when 
he stopped, grasped well from the whole system of Leibniz only the part that clarified in 
his eyes his own theory. (FP.III.83) 
With this reappropriation in place, he moves on to his third and final step and attempts to 
reverse BiranÕs critique and show that it is actually BiranÕs philosophy and not his own that leads 
to pantheism14. CousinÕs argument is typically unpromising. He claims Biran has dangerously 
Ôover-animatedÕ nature. If we start from our free internal causality and argue that we can infer the 
existence of analogous active substances throughout nature, our unique causality ends up being 
no different in kind than the activity of any corporeal substance, and ultimately human liberty is 
reduced to the destiny of nature (PS.181). As all causality is reduced to the same level, it is 
BiranÕs system not CousinÕs that brings with it the true threat of pantheism.  
Nevertheless, CousinÕs attempt to become the true Leibnizian failed. Partly due probably to the 
unconvincing nature of his arguments, but also because Leibniz was appropriated by CousinÕs 
fiercest critics. Pierre Leroux15, Charles Renouvier, and Ravaisson all used distinctly Biran 
influenced readings of Leibniz to attack the philosopher king. Finally, Cousin changed his 
strategy and turned to Descartes. Descartes became the great founder of spiritualist philosophy 
and Cousin significantly reduced LeibnizÕs role in his historical story. By turning to Descartes, he 
could retain the importance of the psychology of reflection, but also gain the benefits of a safe 
political philosophy, which he believed lent support to the constitutional monarchy, while 
concurrently providing France with a national hero16. At the start of his career, he built his 
                                                             
14 See Antoine-Mahut (2015) on ÔLa cousinianisation du biranismeÕ.  
15 See Rey (2012: 410-421) 
16 See Ziljstra (2005).  
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reputation on his supposed knowledge of the philosophies of Germany, but by the end he was at 
pains to distance himself from the accusations of presenting a naturalized German pantheism. 
Appropriating Descartes turned out to be the most effective strategy to do so. The battle turned 
from one over the true heart of LeibnizÕs philosophy to one between Leibnizian and Cartesian 
spiritualisms.  
Simon recounts a conversation with Cousin from around 1848 which would turn out to be 
prophetic. Simon had just come from a discussion with CousinÕs critic Leroux, who had told him 
Òthe whole structure will fall with Cousin. When Cousin disappears, your whole gang of 
professors and your whole school will disappear with himÓ. Simon says he was Ôboiling over with 
rage after this conversationÉ I repeated the story to Cousin as he was breakfasting on bread and 
honey. ÒLeroux is rightÓ, he calmly replied, eating away at the slice he had spreadÕ (1888: 136-
137). As Cousin almost predicted, the text that put the final nail in his philosophical coffin was 
published the same year the final nail was put in his real coffin - 1867. In 1840, Ravaisson 
published a savage critique of CousinÕs philosophy that had, due to CousinÕs all-encompassing 
influence at the time, cost him his university career. RavaissonÕs return to philosophy came in 
1863. He was asked by Victor Duruy, the minister of public instruction, to be the chair of the 
committee in charge of setting the agrgation. When the government decided that a series of 
reports on the progress of the sciences and the arts should be written, Duruy again chose 
Ravaisson for the philosophy report; a decision which had an enormous impact. His Rapport sur 
la philosophie en France au XIXme sicle provided a summary of the development of French 
philosophy throughout the century, but at the same time served as a manifesto for a Biran-
inspired Leibnizian spiritualism in sharp opposition to CousinÕs eclecticism and ComteÕs 
positivism. Published in 1867, the year Cousin died, RavaissonÕs Rapport gave French philosophy 
a whole new lease of life. It gave rise to a veritable sea change in philosophy because it became 
essential reading for the hundreds of students studying for the agrgation for several generations. 
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In terms of understanding the renaissance of Leibnizian ideas towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of this work. Bergson explains this well:    
No analysis can give an idea of these admirable pages. Twenty generations have learned 
them by heart. They have counted for a great deal in the influence exercised by the 
Rapport on philosophy as studied in the universities, an influence whose precise limits 
cannot be determined, nor whose depth be plumbed, nor whose nature be exactly 
described, any more than one can convey the inexpressible colouring which a great 
enthusiasm of early youth sometimes diffuses over the whole life of man... The RapportÉ 
[gave] rise to a change of orientation in philosophy in the university [and] RavaissonÕs 
influence succeeded the influence of Cousin. (1946: 284, 290) 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Interpreting and thinking with Leibniz played a central role in the development and battles that 
characterised nineteenth-century philosophy in France. Understanding this strategic role for 
LeibnizÕs metaphysics in this period is crucial for grasping why many philosophers provided their 
particular interpretations of his thought. Nonetheless, as I have shown in this chapter, this does 
not mean that they did not gain important insights into the sage of HannoverÕs philosophy. In 
fact, Biran developed strikingly original arguments that breathed new life into LeibnizÕs work and 
showed the great potential of his spiritualist experiential metaphysics, so that, through Ravaisson, 
it would become deeply embedded in French thought in such a way that the limits of this 
influence could never be precisely determined. Boutroux, Renouvier, and mile Boirac, amongst 
others, would all further explore the great potential of experiential Leibnizian spiritualism 
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throughout the nineteenth century and provide ingenious insights of their own. However, the 
first to expose this great potential was Maine de Biran.  
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